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Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany 
is taking stock: Has reunification been a success? 
How much of the East-West divide has remained or is 
returning? The results of recent state elections in Thu-
ringia, Brandenburg and Saxony appear to support two 
conclusions: Eastern Germans are wired differently! 
And they vote differently, too! But the question is: Why? 
The various election results have been interpreted as 
and attributed to an East-West divide. But is that right?
This analysis shows that the opposite is the case for 
the AfD’s election results. Instead of regional origins, 
it is social milieus and circumstances of life that 
shape the individual voting behavior. As elsewhere, 
the electoral success of right-wing populists in 
Germany runs along a new social line of conflict sepa-
rating skeptics of modernization from supporters 
of modernization. In social, economic and cultural 
terms, the milieus that are skeptical of modernization 
see themselves as the “losers” of modernization 
processes, feel that they are no longer sufficiently 
represented by the mainstream parties, are dissatis-
fied with democracy’s performance, are losing their 
trust in democratic institutions, and are turning away 
from the mainstream parties. For their part, the pro- 
modernization milieus view precisely these stances 
as a threat to democracy and social progress. The 
result is a new line of conflict that is strongly polari-
zing Germany – but one that runs diagonally through 
society as a whole rather than between Eastern and 
Western Germany. This line of conflict is one that 
affects all of society and therefore all of Germany, and 
it follows socio-cultural patterns that are very similar 
in Eastern and Western Germany. Thus, 30 years after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germans are more similar 
than they think – also at the ballot box!
A conflict line through Germany  
or a new East-West divide?
Are Eastern Germans “wired” differently? The results of the recent state elections 
in Thuringia, Brandenburg and Saxony appear to support this hypothesis. But, more 
than anything, they reflect new lines of conflict in society that are very similar in  
Eastern and Western Germany. This also applies to the election results of the  
right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) party.
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“Lega East” or Germany-wide milieu party?
The AfD’s state election results in Thuringia (23.4%), 
Brandenburg (23.5%) and Saxony (27.5%) make the 
right-wing populists look like an Eastern German 
regional party. Already with the 2017 elections for 
Germany’s federal parliament, the Bundestag, the 
AfD’s results in Eastern Germany (21.9%) were roughly 
twice as high as they were in Western Germany 
(10.7%). The AfD succeeded in sustaining this level of 
support in the three federal state elections in Eastern 
Germany held in 2019.
Does this mean the AfD is becoming a regional 
Eastern German party? A kind of “Lega East” akin to 
Italy’s “Lega Nord”? 
 
For one thing, the proportions of the potential voters 
in Eastern and Western Germany alone would argue 
against this. In big picture terms, those who voted 
for the AfD in the state election in Thuringia only 
make up 0.4% of all eligible voters in Germany, and 
the figure is only 1.9% if you combine the AfD voters 
for all three elections in Eastern Germany in 2019. 
In other words, the AfD’s high percentages actually 
only constitute a relatively meager share of all eligible 
voters in Germany. What’s more, in order to surpass 
the 5% hurdle required to secure seats in the Bundes-
tag, as a purely regional party, the AfD would have to 
win more than 25% of the votes in Eastern Germany 
on a sustained basis. And despite having election 
results that were twice as high in Eastern Germany, 
the share of Eastern Germans among all AfD voters 
was and continues to be less than a third. 
Thus, for the time being, the AfD is a Germany-wide 
phenomenon rather than a “Lega East.” 
 
The milieu analysis (Fig. p.2) also shows this. Much 
larger than the regional differences between Eastern 
and Western Germany are the discrepancies among 
the social milieus. The percentage of people in 
Eastern Germany who intend to vote for the AfD is 
almost twice as high as that of their counterparts 
in Western Germany (22% and 13.4%, respectively). 
But voters from the socially Precarious milieu in 
both Eastern and Western Germany opt for the 
AfD about four times as often as voters from the 
Liberal Intellectual milieu. On average, voters in this 
pro-modernization milieu of the Liberal Intellectuals 
in both Eastern and Western Germany only opt for the 
AfD about half as often as the average of all voters. 
In contrast, in the modernization-skeptical milieu 
of the socially Precarious, this rate is twice as high 
as the overall average. Granted, differences between 
Eastern and Western Germany are also evident in the 
milieu-based analysis of the election results. But the 
differences among the milieus themselves are much 
more pronounced than those between East and West.
The AfD is a modernization-skeptical milieu party
The milieu analysis shows that the AfD is primarily 
a party of the modernization-skeptical milieus in 
Eastern Germany, as well (Fig. p.3). Roughly two-
thirds of its voters belong to a milieu that tends to 
be skeptical of modernization. Thus, as in Western 
Germany, the AfD also has a unique characteristic in 
terms of party politics in Eastern Germany: It is the 
only party for which a vast majority of its voters come 
from milieus that are skeptical of modernization and 
below the social line of conflict running diagonally 
through the social milieus. In addition to the socially 
Precarious, which accounts for about 13% of all 
 
“Voting intention for the AfD”
Source: YouGov on behalf of 
the Bertelsmann Stiftung.
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BRIEFLY EXPLAINED: Is the AfD a kind of “Lega East”?  
The results of the three recent state elections in Eastern  
Germany – in Thuringia (23.4%), Brandenburg (23.5%) and 
Saxony (27.5%) – suggest that this might be the case. In the  
citizens’ panel of the Democracy Monitor, the AfD had 22% of 
the vote in Eastern Germany and 13.4% in Western Germany. 
But the discrepancies among the societal milieus themselves 
are much bigger than the regional East-West differences. 
Among members of the modernization-optimistic Liberal  
Intellectuals, only 8% in Western Germany and 13% in Eastern 
Germany opt for the AfD. But, in the modernization-skeptical 
milieu of the socially Precarious, the respective figures are 
30% and 46%. This shows that, rather than being a case of 
“the” Eastern Germans voting differently than “the” Western 
Germans, members of the same societal milieus in both  
Eastern and Western Germany vote at an above-average  
rate for the right-wing populist AfD party.
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eligible voters in Eastern Germany, these include the 
Traditionals (11%), the Modern Mainstreamers (15%) 
and parts of the Established (4%) and the consump-
tion-oriented Hedonists (8%). These milieus, which 
are rather skeptical of modernization, make up 
about half of all eligible voters in Eastern Germany, 
but about two-thirds of all AfD voters.
In contrast, the milieus above the diagonal line, 
which tend to be pro-modernization, vote for the 
AfD at a far-below-average rate. At the same time, 
with more than two-thirds (68%) of its voters 
belonging to one of the milieus above the line of 
conflict, the Green Party is the pro-modernization 
opposite pole of the AfD. Although to lesser degrees, 
this also holds true for voters of the center-left SPD, 
the far-left Left Party and the Liberals (FDP). The 
only voters in Eastern Germany who are divided 
exactly 50-50 on both sides of the line of conflict are 
those of the center-right CDU and CSU parties.
Same milieus, similar voting patterns in East and West
The East German line of conflict between skeptics and 
supporters of modernization identified here for 2019 
corresponds very closely to the Germany-wide line 
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Conflict line through all of society in Eastern Germany
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BRIEFLY EXPLAINED: Roughly two-thirds of all AfD voters in Eastern Germany belong to a social milieu that is skeptical of 
modernization. Thus, the AfD also has a unique characteristic in terms of party politics in Eastern Germany: It is the only party 
for whom a majority of its voters come from milieus that are skeptical of modernization and below the new social line of conflict. 
In addition to the socially Precarious milieu, which accounts for about 13% of all eligible voters in Eastern Germany, these 
include the Traditionals (11%), the Modern Mainstreamers (15%) and parts of the Established (4%) and the consumption-ori-
ented Hedonists (8%). These milieus, which are rather skeptical of modernization, make up about half of all eligible voters in 
Eastern Germany, but about two-thirds of all AfD voters. In contrast, AfD voters come from the milieus above the diagonal line, 
which tend to be pro-modernization, at a rate that is far below average. At the same time, with more than two-thirds (68%) of 
its voters belonging to one of the milieus above the line of conflict, the Green Party is the pro-modernization antithesis of the 
AfD. Although to lesser degrees, this also holds true for voters of the center-left SPD, the far-left Left Party and the Liberals 
(FDP). The only voters in Eastern Germany who are divided exactly 50-50 on both sides of the line of conflict are those of the 
center-right CDU and CSU parties.
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Western Germany and, above all, by a milieu-specific 
concentration and intensification effect in each:
  On the one hand, the typical AfD voter milieus 
are quantitatively much more strongly repre-
sented in Eastern than in Western Germany. 
For example, the Precarious milieu currently 
accounts for roughly 13% of all eligible voters 
in the East (Western Germany: 8%), and the 
Modern Mainstreamers 15% (Western Ger-
many: 12%). At the same time, only about  
6% of all eligible voters in Eastern Germany 
are classified as belonging to the rather 
modernization-optimistic and AfD-critical 
milieus of Liberal Intellectuals (Western 
Germany: 8%) and Cosmopolitan Avant- 
gardes (6% in Eastern Germany and 9% in 
Western Germany).
  On the other hand, a milieu-specific concen-
tration and intensification effect has a much 
stronger qualitative effect: The stronger and 
more spatially concentrated the moderni- 
zation-critical AfD milieus of the Precarious 
and the Modern Mainstreamers are in Eastern 
Germany, the higher the election results of the 
AfD are. The social concentration here very 
obviously also leads to a stronger normalization 
and increased social acceptance of voting for 
the right-wing populist AfD. 
Taken together, these two effects of the quantitative 
and qualitative milieu concentration of the socially 
Precarious and the Modern Mainstreamers can almost 
completely explain why the AfD’s election results 
are roughly twice as high in Eastern Germany. Thus, 
the AfD primarily has much higher election results 
in Eastern than in Western Germany because its core 
voter milieus are more strongly represented in the 
East, and because they vote for the AfD at higher rates 
owing to their concentration. But the moderniza-
tion-skeptical milieus that vote for the AfD are the 
same in both Eastern and Western Germany; they are 
just found more frequently and in higher concentra-
tions in the East.
The overall picture shows that social status and 
milieu-specific socio-cultural attitudes and imprints 
explain the divergent election results in Eastern and 
Western Germany much better than purely regional 
East-West differences. 
of conflict identified for the 2017 Bundestag election 
(Vehrkamp & Wegschaider 2017, p. 15). This also 
holds true for the milieus of AfD voters. As was the 
case in the 2017 Bundestag election, the two milieus 
with the highest proportions of AfD voters in Eastern 
and Western Germany are those of the Precarious and 
the Modern Mainstreamers.
The predicted probability that an eligible voter in East- 
ern Germany from the Precarious milieu will vote for 
the AfD is a significantly above-average 44.2%, whe-
reas the figure for Western Germany is 32.3%. The 
probability that an eligible voter in Eastern Germany 
from the Modern Mainstreamers will vote for the AfD 
is 35.3%, while the figure for Western Germany is 
likewise a significantly above-average 19.3%.
In contrast, the probability that someone from the 
Liberal Intellectuals will vote for the AfD is a signifi-
cantly below-average 12.4% in the East and 8.1% in 
the West. And the probability that someone from the 
modernization-optimistic milieu of the Performers 
will vote for the AfD is similarly below-average, at 
15.2% in the East and 9.9% in the West.
These milieu patterns demonstrate that the typical 
voter and non-voter milieus of the AfD are the 
same in Eastern and Western Germany. At the same 
time, the differences among the milieus themselves 
are much bigger and more pronounced than those 
between East and West. What’s more, the rest of the 
East-West discrepancies in the election results for the 
AfD can almost entirely be explained by the varying 
strengths of the respective milieus in Eastern and 
“Social conditions explain the election  
results better than regional origin.”
Sources:
This edition of the Policy Brief is published in connection with the  
Democracy Monitor, a project being jointly conducted by the Bertelsmann  
Stiftung and the Berlin Social Science Center (WZB).
Both the Democracy Monitor and this analysis are based on a representative  
online survey concerning political attitudes. The survey’s sample is  
representative for residents of Germany. The survey was conducted on behalf  
of the Bertelsmann Stiftung by YouGov Deutschland GmbH in three iterations  
between May and July 2019. The sample size is approximately 10,000  
respondents per iteration.
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Line of conflict (I):  
Trust in Germany’s Bundestag
Similar social conditions lead to similar socio-cul-
tural attitudes and voting behavior – in both Eastern 
and Western Germany! This is shown, for example, 
by the following milieu-specific attitudes about how 
well Germany’s democracy is functioning, trust in 
the Bundestag, and whether democracy is the best 
political system. Faith in democracy requires trust 
in its institutions. In fact, the degree of trust in 
institutions is even more important to a democracy’s 
stability than the much more frequently cited degree 
of trust in its actors. When in doubt, its actors can 
be replaced via a democratic process. In contrast, a 
democracy’s key institutions cannot be completely 
replaced and are much more difficult to change. 
Thus, the degree of trust in Germany’s Bundestag 
is an important pillar of the faith in its democracy, 
functioning and legitimacy as the best political 
system.
Even if the majority of Germans at least trust rather 
than mistrust the Bundestag, 15% of all eligible voters 
in Western Germany and even almost a quarter (23%) 
of those in Eastern Germany agree with the statement 
“I have no trust in the Bundestag”. On the face of 
it, this initially suggests that – as with intentions to 
vote for the AfD – there is a significant East-West 
discrepancy, and that one can hastily infer from this 
that “all” residents of Eastern Germany have less 
confidence in the Bundestag than “all” residents of 
Western Germany.
However, the milieu analysis shows that there are 
some social milieus in Eastern and Western Germany 
in which almost everyone at least trusts rather than 
mistrusts the Bundestag, while at the same time  
the distrust of parliament is much more strongly  
pronounced in other social milieus than for the 
average of all milieus. This is illustrated, for example, 
by the degrees of trust of members of the moderni- 
zation-skeptical milieu of the socially Precarious and 
of the modernization-optimistic Performers. Only a 
small minority of people do not trust the Bundestag 
“at all” in Eastern Germany (6%) and Western 
Germany (8%), and the figures for the Performers in 
the East are even slightly better than those of their 
counterparts in the West. But the socially Precarious 
are much more distrustful in both Eastern and 
Western Germany. In Western Germany, more than 
a third (36%) of all eligible voters from the socially 
Precarious milieu do not trust the Bundestag “at all,” 
and the analogous share in Eastern Germany is one 
out of every two (50%).
Thus, both the levels of distrust in the Bundestag 
and the related discrepancies between East and West 
can be explained by milieu affiliations. Indeed, it 
is not that “the” Eastern Germans have less trust 
in the Bundestag than “the” Western Germans. 
Instead, it is the modernization-skeptical milieus 
below the new line of conflict in German society as 
a whole that have less confidence in the Bundestag 
than members of the milieus above the conflict line 
that favor or actively advance modernization. And 
because these milieus are found more frequently and 
in higher concentrations in Eastern Germany than in 
Western Germany, the level of distrust is higher in 
the East than in the West.
 
“I have no trust in 
the Bundestag”
Source: YouGov on behalf of 
the Bertelsmann Stiftung.
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BRIEFLY EXPLAINED: Of all eligible voters, 15% in Western 
Germany and almost a quarter (23%) in Eastern Germany 
agree with the statement “I have no trust in the Bundes-
tag.” So, do “the” Eastern Germans have less confidence 
in the Bundestag than “the” Western German? The milieu 
analysis shows that there are social milieus in Eastern and 
Western Germany in which almost everyone has confidence 
in the Bundestag (Performers), while at the same time the 
distrust of parliament is much more strongly pronounced in 
other social milieus (Precarious). Indeed, it is not that “the” 
Eastern Germans have less trust in the Bundestag than “the” 
Western Germans. Instead, it is the modernization-skeptical 
milieus below the new line of conflict in German society as 
a whole that have less trust in the Bundestag than members 
of the milieus above the conflict line that favor or actively 
advance modernization.
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“the” Western Germans. Instead, it is the moder-
nization-skeptical milieus below the new line of 
conflict in German society as a whole that are much 
more dissatisfied than the modernization-optimistic 
milieus above the conflict line. What’s more, the 
concentration of these milieus in Eastern Germany 
only boosts their level of dissatisfaction. But it is 
these same milieus, social conditions and resulting 
socio-cultural attitudes that lead to this dissatisfac-
tion and its manifestation.
Thus, rather than running between Eastern and 
Western Germany, the wall separating those who are 
satisfied with the functioning of the democracy from 
those who are not runs as a diagonal conflict line 
straight through the social milieus of German society 
as a whole.
Line of conflict (II):  
Satisfaction with the democracy’s performance 
Representation gaps are fostering increased levels of 
dissatisfaction with the functioning of the democracy 
and leading more citizens to vote for populist par-
ties, which have criticism of the democracy’s perfor-
mance as one of the core defining elements of their 
brand. In Germany, dissatisfaction with democracy 
is by far most pronounced among AfD voters. Only 
non-voters are less satisfied with its functioning.
A comparison of East and West shows that, on aver-
age, Eastern Germans are much more dissatisfied 
with the functioning of the democracy than eligible 
voters in Western Germany. Whereas only 8% of 
all eligible voters in Western Germany believe that 
democracy “does not work at all,” the analogous 
figure is 14% in Eastern Germany, or almost twice as 
high.
But why is that? 
Are people in Eastern Germany more dissatisfied 
with the functioning of the democracy because they 
are Eastern Germans? Or does one’s sociocultural 
milieu prove to be the more dominant explanatory 
factor in this case, as well?
If one takes milieus into consideration, it become 
apparent that the discrepancies in satisfaction be- 
tween Eastern and Western Germany are much less 
regionally determined and much more driven by the 
differences in satisfaction among the social milieus. 
In fact, in the modernization-optimistic Performer 
milieu, the levels of both satisfaction and dissatis-
faction with the democracy’s performance are at 
exactly the same levels in both Eastern and Western 
Germany. Only 4% of the eligible voters belonging 
to the Performers in both Eastern and Western 
Germany believe that the country’s democracy “does 
not work at all”. In contrast, this belief is held by 
almost a quarter (22%) of all eligible voters from the 
socially Precarious milieu in Western Germany and 
by more than a third (35%) of their counterparts  
in Eastern Germany. If one also considers that  
the socially Precarious are much more strongly  
represented in Eastern than in Western Germany, 
the following also becomes apparent:
It is not that “the” Eastern Germans are less 
satisfied with the democracy’s performance than 
 
“Democracy does not 
work at all”
Source: YouGov on behalf of 
the Bertelsmann Stiftung.
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BRIEFLY EXPLAINED: Whereas only 8% of all eligible voters 
in Western Germany believe that the democracy “does not 
work at all,” the analogous figure is 14% in Eastern Germany. 
However, while this view is held by only 4% of eligible voters 
from the Performers milieu in Germany as a whole, among 
those in the socially Precarious milieu, almost a quarter 
(22%) in the West and more than a third (35%) in the East 
share this opinion. This shows that it is not that “the” Eastern 
Germans are less satisfied with the democracy’s performan-
ce than “the” Western Germans. Instead, it is the moder-
nization-skeptical milieus below the new line of conflict of 
German society as a whole that are much more dissatisfied 
than the modernization-optimistic milieus above the conflict 
line. Thus, rather than running between East and West, the 
wall separating the satisfied from the dissatisfied runs as a 
diagonal conflict line straight through the social milieus of 
Germany society as a whole.
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Line of conflict (III):  
Democracy as the best political system
A similar picture emerges regarding the general 
attitude toward democracy as the best political sys-
tem. For the legitimacy of democracy, its acceptance 
as the best political system is even more important 
than satisfaction with its functioning. Functional 
shortcomings can but do not necessarily lead to 
systemic legitimacy deficits. As long as it is only a 
democracy’s performance that is criticized, rather 
than its legitimacy as a system, the democracy will 
remain stable as a system. But things get dangerous 
when functional shortcomings also delegitimize the 
system.
Almost no one in Germany absolutely disagrees 
with the statement that “democracy is the best 
political system.” Thus, one can say that criticism 
of the system is much less intense than that of its 
performance. Nevertheless, 8% of eligible voters in 
Western Germany and 14% in Eastern Germany also 
do not explicitly agree with the statement. Instead, 
they place themselves in the lower half (1-3) of an 
opinion scale ranging from 1 (“I do not agree at all”) 
to 7 (“I completely agree”).
However, as with the criticism of democracy’s  
performance, criticism of the system itself can 
actually be explained once again by milieu  
affiliation rather than by regional differences 
between East and West. While in the moderniza- 
tion-optimistic Performer milieu, only 4% of  
all eligible voters in Western Germany and 5% in  
Eastern Germany are critical of the system, the 
figures in the modernization-skeptical milieu of  
the socially Precarious are many times higher. 
Among the Precarious in Western Germany,  
almost one-fifth (18%) are also rather critical  
of democracy as a system. In Eastern Germany,  
this opinion is shared by a quarter (25%) of all 
eligible voters.
Thus, criticism of democracy as a system is less of a 
specifically East-West phenomenon in Germany and 
more the result of specific social circumstances and 
their associated attitude patterns. It is not that “the” 
Eastern Germans are more critical of the democratic 
system than “the” Western Germans. Instead, the 
modernization-skeptical milieus question democracy 
as a political system at a much higher rate than the 
modernization-optimistic milieus.
Once again, the new line of conflict regarding  
the democracy runs diagonally through German 
society as a whole rather than along the old  
wall separating East and West Germany.
Consequently, those who are concerned about  
the level of acceptance of the democratic system 
should endeavor to improve the social conditions  
of people in the modernization-skeptical milieus. 
They feel socio-economically and/or culturally 
suspended, and like the losers of society’s  
modernization processes. However, these mod- 
ernization processes are in turn especially shaped 
and driven by members of the pro-modernization 
milieus above the line of conflict. And it is primarily 
these milieus that benefit most in terms of their 
self-perception. 
 
“Democracy is not 
the best political system”
Source: YouGov on behalf of 
the Bertelsmann Stiftung.
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BRIEFLY EXPLAINED: Of all eligible voters, 8% in  
Western Germany and 14% in Eastern Germany do  
not agree with the statement that “democracy is the  
best political system.” However, while in the moderni- 
zation-optimistic Performers milieu only 4% in Western  
Germany and 5% in Eastern Germany are critical of the 
system, the figures in the modernization-skeptical milieu  
of the socially Precarious are many times higher, at 18%  
in the West and 25% in the East. This shows that it is not 
that “the” Eastern Germans are more critical of the de-
mocratic system than “the” Western Germans. Instead,  
the modernization-skeptical milieus question democracy  
as a political system at a much higher rate than the moder-
nization-optimistic milieus. Thus, the new line of conflict 
regarding the democracy runs diagonally through German 
society as a whole rather than along the old wall separating 
East and West Germany.
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between Eastern and Western Germany can be attribu-
ted to a new line of conflict running through German 
society as a whole rather than to a new wall between 
East and West. This line runs diagonally through the 
social milieus and divides the milieus of the skeptics  
of modernization from those who support it.
This means that similar social conditions in Eastern 
and Western Germany lead to similar socio-cultural 
attitudes and resentments, and that they also shape 
voting behavior in very similar patterns. Social and 
cultural experiences of disparagement and losing 
social status as well as the feeling of being left behind 
and not sufficiently represented by the parties lead 
to criticism of democracy, abstaining from voting 
and/or voting for populist parties and politicians. 
Thus, anyone who is concerned about the state of 
democracy in Germany must not and should not 
either try to achieve a new East-West divide or reck-
lessly cause it to become – 30 years after the fall of 
the Wall – a self-fulfilling prophecy. The experiences 
that the modernization-critical milieus in Eastern 
Germany have had with the country’s transformation 
are very similar to the experiences with globalization 
of the people in the same milieus in the “rust belt” 
Ruhr region of Western Germany. Indeed, 30 years 
after the fall of the Wall, those of us in Western and 
Eastern Germany are much more similar than we 
sometimes suppose – also at the ballot box!
A line of conflict through German society  
rather than a new East-West divide!
The election results in Thuringia seem to once again 
confirm the assumption that “this is just how those 
Eastern Germans are”. Although many interpretations 
and commentaries on the evening of the election did 
not explicitly formulate it in this way, that is what 
they amounted to. The Left Party received the most 
votes, the AfD received almost 24%, and the centrist 
mainstream parties of the old democracy of West 
Germany received less than 50% of the votes combined, 
meaning that they didn’t even have the votes to achieve 
a majority as an oversized four-party coalition.
Thus, 30 years after the fall of the Wall, it still seems 
to be true that Eastern Germans are simply “wired” 
differently, think differently and therefore also vote 
differently. But is this really “because” they are 
Eastern Germans? Do “the” Eastern Germans really 
vote differently than “the” Western Germans? This 
milieu analysis shows that “the” Eastern Germans do 
not intrinsically vote differently than “the” Western 
Germans. Instead, members of the same societal mi- 
lieus in both Eastern and Western Germany vote for the 
right-wing populist AfD party, distrust the institutions 
of our democracy, criticize its performance and question 
its legitimacy as the best political system – all at an 
above-average rate. What’s more, the differences  
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